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Trusting a mobile device using modern public-key cryptography does not assure that the person holding the phone is the same person identified by the certificate being used. 
MULTIFACTOR AUTHENTICATION FOR 
E-COMMERCE USING MOBILE CLIENTS 
The best-practice security protocol for mobile device us-
ers when authenticating themselves to an online service 
is multifactor authentication 
(MFA), which usually is imple-
mented as two-factor authen-
tication (2FA). One example 
of such 2FA is online banking 
sign-on using a password, 
being the something you know 
factor, and a random one-time 
code (nonce) sent to the device 
via text messaging or email, 
whereby sending back the 
nonce the user proves to the 
bank that the user possesses 
the something you have factor. Another example of 2FA is 
a similar combination of password and a secure token 
device that generates tokens locally without transmit-
ting them.
 2FA is not ideal for several reasons. First, it involves 
repeated friction as it is time-consuming and requiring 
multiple actions on part of the user. 2FA is also a rather 
weak protocol because passwords are an inherently weak 
security system15 and are exposed when used in public or 
when a malicious keylogger is present. In addition, 2FA is 
susceptible to the well-known SIM swap attack,1,13 where 
attackers use social engineering techniques to convince 
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the mobile carrier that they are the 
rightful owner of the cell phone num-
ber to obtain a new SIM card. Last but 
not least, if a mobile device is lost or 
stolen while open, then the single re-
maining protection becomes the pass-
word component of the 2FA protocol. 
Secure token devices are also vulnera-
ble because they are not protected and 
can easily be lost.
Hence, the industry is moving to-
ward cryptographic e-commerce au-
thentication for mobile devices (that 
is,  the Fast Identity Online standard7); 
such authentication protocols rely on 
digital signatures as follows. During 
registration, the mobile device obtains 
a certified key-pair (private and pub-
lic) from the e-commerce service (for 
example, a banking service) or some 
trusted certification authority (CA). To 
authenticate to an e-commerce session, 
the service provider sends the device a 
nonce challenge, the device signs it with 
its private key, and the service validates 
the signature using the public key. Such 
a protocol is both more secure and also 
seamless to the mobile device owner.
As an example, consider authen-
ticating for your online banking sys-
tem. With a digital signature-based 
authentication method, you will start 
by opening your banking application 
on your mobile device. The app will 
validate your presence using biomet-
ric authentication and then prove to 
the banking service that your device 
holds the (secret) private key associ-
ated with the public key registered 
with your account. Proof is accom-
plished using the challenge-response 
protocol described previously.
Clearly, since a key-pair is just a pair 
of mathematically related numbers, a 
signature on its own does not imply that 
any mobile device in particular signed 
the given document: hence enter digital 
certificates. A certificate is signed by a 
trusted CA (trusted by the verifier); it is 
the manifestation of trust, effectively 
saying that “the trusted authority veri-
fied that person/company with identity 
x is associated with public key y.” A digi-
tal certificate ties such a trusted identity 
of the individual that owns the device to 
the public key listed in the certificate. 
Since that public key is associated with 
a unique private key, then the certificate 
effectively binds all three artifacts to-
gether, namely a private key (resides on 
device), a public key (easily computable 
from the private key, also resides in the 
certificate,) and the identity of the cer-
tificate holder.
However, as mentioned earlier, peo-
ple do not sign digital documents, de-
vices do. Hence, for example, if a device 
is lost or stolen, then absent further 
protection, the thief can authenticate 
on behalf of the owner. For this reason, 
digital signatures performed on mobile 
devices are typically temporally pre-
ceded by biometric authentication. Nev-
ertheless, biometric authentication can 
be reduced to password authentication 
(after multiple trial and errors), thereby 
reducing the entire e-commerce au-
thentication process to one-factor au-
thentication (1FA), which is the device’s 
password. Moreover, the e-commerce 
service provider cannot guarantee that 
the application performing biometric 
authentication on its behalf is the in-
tended authenticator because any mo-
bile application can sign using private 
keys on the same device.
A note about password security, 
whether for authenticating into the 
mobile device or as part of e-commerce 
MFA, is due. Most e-commerce services 
have built-in procedures that promote 
safe password usage, such as periodic 
password changes and password com-
plexity tests. The flipside of strong and 
fresh password maintenance, however, 
is increased friction, where the user 
needs to remember and enter many dif-
ferent passwords on his/her mobile de-
vices. As a result, some scary statistics 
about password reuse have emerged, 
such as that 65% of users reuse pass-
words or that an average person reuses 
as password on as many as 14 times. In 
short, although e-commerce services 
try to enforce password security, end 
users are not complying that well.
The underlying problem is, there-
fore, how can one better ensure that the 
person whose trusted identity appears 
in the certificate is the person holding 
the device while the device is signing a 
nonce or any other document?
This article proposes a generic solu-
tion based on a hybrid of biometric 
authentication artifacts, digital certif-
icates, and error correction.
BIOMETRIC 
AUTHENTICATION FOR 
MOBILE DEVICES
Biometric authentication relies on 
the unique biological characteristics 
of the individual holding the device 
to verify that he or she is the per-
son that originally trained the de-
vice. Biometric authentication sys-
tems use varying levels of machine 
learning (ML) to compare runtime 
biometric data (henceforth, biomet-
rics) to biometrics collected during 
training.
Numerous commercially available 
mobile device biometric systems exist 
on the market, including the following:
 › fingerprint scanning,6 which 
authenticates using patterns of 
raised areas and branches in the 
individual’s finger image
 › finger vein ID,14 which authen-
ticates using vascular pattern in 
the individual’s finger
To authenticate to an e-commerce session, 
the service provider sends the device a nonce 
challenge, the device signs it with its private key, 
and the service validates the signature  
using the public key.
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 › facial recognition, which au-
thenticates using numeric codes 
for nodal points on a human face 
called faceprints
 › voice verification, which authen-
ticates using characteristics of 
the individual’s voice
 › retina scans,5 which authen-
ticates using blood vessel 
patterns in the light-sensitive 
surface lining the individual’s 
inner eye
 › iris recognition, which authen-
ticates using unique patterns 
within the ring-shaped region 
surrounding the pupil of the eye
 › neuro print,9,10  which authen-
ticates using micro-vibrational 
patterns in the user’s hands.
Often, individual biometric data dif-
fer from one reading to another. Con-
sider voice verification. For example, 
if an individual says “I am John, John 
Doe” on two different recordings, there 
are bound to be differences between 
the two, such as speed, pitch, and some-
times even more profound changes due 
to allergies or weather sensitivities. 
Hence, many of these biometric authen-
tication systems rely on signal process-
ing and subsequent ML to authenticate.
Mobile ML systems for biometric au-
thentication are initially trained by the 
device owner before being used for run-
time authentication. Both phases rely on 
features (numeric values such as face-
prints) extracted from sensors on the 
device, while the owner is holding the 
device. The training phase uses features 
to train one or more ML algorithm such 
as neural networks or random decision 
forests (RDFs),11 whereas the classifica-
tion phase inputs features to trained ML 
models to decide whether the individual 
holding the phone is the same individ-
ual that trained the system.
Each aut hent icator produces a 
Boolean output. Some ML techniques, 
such as RDFs, use batteries of relatively 
small authenticators (for example, 
random decision trees) called bit-clas-
sifiers, thereby yielding a vector of bits 
Vt, as illustrated in Figure 1. The over-
all authenticator (that is, the RDF) ac-
cepts or rejects the input using a sim-
ple metric such as a majority vote.
The ML process illustrated in Fig - 
ure 1 operates as follows. In the training 
phase, the ML system trains the indi-
vidual bit-classifiers using a relatively 
large training set. The classifiers are 
trained so that their majority vote for 
end user acceptance and their majority 
vote for prospective attacker rejection 
achieve desired levels according to var-
ious metrics such as precision, recall, 
or F1 score.8 In the runtime phase, a 
single vector of features is presented to 
the battery of classifiers, and the single 
majority vote determines the outcome 
of the authentication.
In our proposed technique detailed 
below, we use such batteries of bit-classi-
fiers, but without the majority vote step.
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Decision
Tree)
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Classifier
(for Example,
Decision
Tree)
 2
Classifier
(for Example,
Decision
Tree)
n
. . .RDF:
Training Data
(Features)
Subset 1 Subset 2
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Training Runtime
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FIGURE 1. The ML process using batteries of bit-classifiers.
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ERROR CORRECTION CODES
Error correction is primarily used 
in telecommunication applications, 
where a sender encodes the message 
with redundant information in the 
form of an error correction code (ECC). 
The redundancy allows the receiver to 
correct a limited number of errors that 
may occur anywhere in the message.
The two main categories of ECCs are 
block codes and convolutional codes. 
Block codes work on fixed-size blocks 
of bits of predetermined size. Practical 
block codes can generally be hard de-
coded in polynomial time to their block 
length. Convolutional codes work on bit 
or symbol streams of arbitrary length. 
The block size of a convolutional code is 
generally arbitrary, while block codes 
have a fixed size dictated by their alge-
braic characteristics.
With the proposed application, the 
vector Vt of Figure 1, obtained during 
ML training, takes the role of the trans-
mitted message. A corresponding vector 
Vt−, obtained during runtime authenti-
cation, takes the role of the received mes-
sage. Error correction is then applied to 
Vt− to obtain the original vector Vt.
THE PROPOSED GENERIC 
SOLUTION
The proposed solution takes part in 
two phases: 1) during certificate gen-
eration and 2) during runtime mobile 
device authentication.
The proposed certificate 
generation process
 › The device owner trains his 
or her biometric authentica-
tion ML system and generates 
a battery M-bit-classifier. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, given a 
vector of features, this bat-
tery induces a corresponding 
M-bit vector Vt (the size of M 
is discussed in the “Research 
Challenges” section).
 › The device owner obtains ECC 
bits for Vt, denoted as E(Vt), 
using an error correction algo-
rithm of choice such as a Golay 
block code.3,4
 › The device owner generates 
two key-pairs: i) KPi = (di, Qi), a 
key-pair associated with owners’ 
identity, where the private key 
is a nonce, and ii) KPb = (db, Qb), a 
key-pair associated with owner’s 
biometric features. (With a con-
temporary elliptic curve digital 
signature algorithm (ECDSA), 
the private key d is a long 
number (256 bits long), and its 
corresponding public key Q is a 
point on the agreed-upon curve.)  
The private key is db = Vt + rb, 
with Vt being Vt of Figure 1 and 
rb being a nonce. The private key 
db, based on Vt of the training 
set, is called the golden private 
key. Note that two keys are 
stored in the mobile device’s 
secure key storage: di and rb; Vt 
is not stored anywhere, that is, it 
is abandoned.
 › The device owner sends a certif-
icate signing request (CSR) to a 
CA that is trusted by the service 
provider. The CSR contains the 
owner’s identity, E(Vt)—the 
abovementioned ECC bits and 
the two public keys Qi and Qb.
 › The CA verifies the iden-
tity and returns a signed 
certificate.
The proposed runtime 
authentication process
 › The mobile device sends a  
user id to the service (that is, 
the online banking  
service).
 › The online service returns two 
random nonces: Ri and Rb.
 › The mobile device signs Ri  
using di.
 › The mobile device collects 
end user features and gen-
erates a vector Vt− of M 
bit-classifications.
 › The mobile device uses E(Vt) 
taken from his or her certifi-
cate and applies error correc-
tion to Vt−, thereby retrieving 
a corrected vector Vt+ of M 
bit-classifications.
 › The mobile device signs Rb using 
db+ = rb + Vt+ as the private key of 
KPi. We call this private key the 
actual private key as opposed to 
the golden private key of the third 
step in the “Proposed Certificate 
Generation Process” section.
 › The mobile device sends both 
signed-Ri and signed-Rb, along 
with the certificate, to the 
service provider for signature 
verification.
 › The service provider verifies 
both signatures using the 
public keys in the end user’s 
certificate.
The reason for creating db+ = rb + Vt+ 
rather than using Vt alone is to pre-
clude adversaries from using potential 
adversarial databases of Vts built with 
features taken from social platforms 
(in case of facial recognition systems) 
or hacked databases (for example, 
hacked fingerprint databases).
Note that the two kinds of key-pairs 
(KPi and KPb) have very different re-
sponsibilities. KPb is responsible for 
assuring that the person holding the 
phone is the same person that regis-
tered the identity. As for KPi, there is 
one such pair per e-commerce service 
to which the device owner subscribes, 
such as one for the bank, one for an 
online retailer, and so on. However, 
if and when the false negative rate 
associated with the verification of 
signed-Rb is noticeable, some appli-
cations might choose to turn off that 
verification requirement when the 
mobile device is in a safe area, such as 
at home or at work.
RESEARCH CHALLENGES
 › Individual trees in an RDF are 
rather simple data structures; 
they cannot be relied on as a 
good obfuscator. Hence, privacy 
preserving bit-classifier batter-
ies are preferred.2
 › When used for authentication, 
individual bit-classifiers such 
as RDF trees, are trained to 
produce ones for the owner 
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and zeros for the attacker, with 
a majority vote deciding on 
the final outcome. In our case, 
however, these bits should have 
a more balanced distribution 
of zeros and ones. Naively, one 
could simply flip the logic of 
a one-producing classifier to 
convert it to a zero-producing 
one. An attacker, however, can 
easily distinguish between 
these bit-classifiers, thereby 
gaining insight into the un-
derlying code. The research 
challenge is therefore to build a 
battery of bit-classifiers where 
some of the bit-classifiers gen-
erate a zero while some gener-
ate a one, ensuring that the two 
types are hard to distinguish 
without having the owner’s 
biometric data.
 › Private keys for a contempo-
rary ECDSA12 are 256 bits long. 
Consider, for example, that the 
Golay3,4 block error correction 
code applied to Vt− in the fifth 
step of the “Proposed Runtime 
Authentication Process” section 
is capable of correcting three 
errors of 12 data bits (using 11 
ECC bits). One can then assume 
therefore that three of the 12 bits 
are visible, that is, that entropy 
exists only in the remaining 
9 bits. Therefore, one needs at 
least 28 error correction blocks, 
inducing M = 336 (28*12) or 
more bit-classifiers overall. For 
the sake of a back-of-envelope 
calculation, assume that the true 
positive rate (TPR) of all of the M 
bit-classifiers is p = 0.9 and that 
all bit-classifiers are indepen-
dent. The probability of four to 
12 errors in one ECC will then 
be ∑k=412  = ( k12)(1 − p)kp12 − k = 0.026, 
and therefore the probability of 
all 28 ECCs being able to correct 
properly is (1 − 0.026)28 = 0.48, 
which is rather low. With a TPR of 
0.95, however, that last num-
ber goes up to 0.94, which will 
induce some friction (multiple 
authentication attempts) but not 
overwhelming friction.
On the flip side, a false positive rate 
of f = 0.1 will induce a miniscule proba-
bility (1.41*10 − 190) of an adversary us-
ing his or her own features to create a 
vector Vt that has three or fewer errors 
in all 28 blocks.
In summary, to generate a reliable 
private key db using ECDSA, a large col-
lection of high-quality bit-classifiers is 
required. While some biometric systems 
might be capable of producing more 
high-quality bit-classifiers than others, 
it is highly nontrivial to create or more 
bit-classifiers with such high TPRs.
 › Absent a comprehensive 
scientific comparison of the 
entropy content of various 
biometric classification tech-
niques, one can only make the 
general observation that there 
are likely entropy differences 
between the various biometric 
techniques. Some techniques 
such as facial recognition are 
more susceptible to attacks 
that use publicly available user 
data. Other techniques such as 
neuro print have no available 
databases, public or other-
wise; moreover, neuro-print2,3 
exhibits far more chaotic signal 
behavior than facial features 
for example.
 › As described in the first step 
in the section “The Proposed 
Certificate Generation Process,” 
the vector Vt is extracted from 
the training set. However, every 
vector of features induces its 
own vector Vt. It is unclear which 
such vector, or combination 
thereof, is the one that makes the 
overall system work the best.
 › Adversarial ML techniques 
exploit the way that ML algo-
rithms work to disrupt the be-
havior of artificial intelligence 
algorithms; the adversarial 
robustness of ML algorithms is 
an active area of research. An 
obvious research challenge is, 
therefore, the identification 
of adversarial attacks on the 
proposed battery of biometric 
classifiers.
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